

null
Diana T Fritz 08/28/2006 11:33:06 AM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable
Text:

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 04227

SIPDIS
CXABU:

ACTION: FCS
INFO: POL ICE CDA ECON AMB DCM P/M

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:MQUINN
DRAFTED: FCS:MEOBRIEN
CLEARED: AMB CG FCS POLM

VZCZCADI619
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUCPDO
DE RUEHAD #4227/01 2781311
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051311Z OCT 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1900
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 5469
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004227

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR NP U/S JOSEPH, PMCNERNEY, NP/RA CRUSSELL, NP/CBM,
NP/ECC, NEA/ARPI
NSC FOR DSTEPHENS
USDOC FOR BIS ACTING U/S PLICHTENBAUM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015
TAGS: [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [IR](#) [PK](#) [TC](#) [SY](#) [NK](#)
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: UAE PROMISES CONTINUED COOPERATION ON
COUNTERPROLIFERATION

Classified By: (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele Sison for reasons 1
.5(b) and (d).

¶1. (S) Summary: On October 1-2, 2005, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, National Security Director for Counterproliferation Strategy David Stephens, and T Senior Advisor Patricia McNerney met with UAE officials to discuss the issue of Iran,s nuclear program. The delegation also encouraged the UAE to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative and proposed a bilateral US/UAE Counterproliferation Task Force that would enhance cooperation at both the policy level and the experts level to address proliferation issues. Both Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan (Deputy Prime Minister and MinState for Foreign Affairs), and his brother, Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan (Information Minister) expressed grave concern about the Iranian threat to the UAE and regional stability. They supported international diplomatic efforts to bring Iran to account for its nuclear program. Both leaders welcomed the proposed Counterproliferation Task Force, agreeing that the UAE needed to do more to address the problem of proliferation. The delegation also met with the Central Bank Governor to discuss ways to take action against the income and assets of proliferators (septel). The final meeting was with the head of Dubai,s State Security Office where the delegation heard a description of the UAE,s own nascent interagency nonproliferation task force and discussed specific cases. End summary.

¶2. (S) On October 1, the delegation and Ambassador met with HbZ bin Zayed Al Nahyan (HbZ) Deputy Prime Minister and MinState Foreign Affairs). HbZ began the meeting by assuring Under Secretary Joseph of the UAE,s continued cooperation with the U.S. He expressed serious concerns about the nuclear program in Iran. Joseph shared his appreciation for the strong strategic relationship with the UAE and agreed that it is important to the entire international community to fight terrorism and to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. HbZ reiterated the UAE,s full support in this effort, including the federal government and local (emirate-level) governments. He said further that the UAE is very keen to preserve regional stability, thereby preserving the relative stability that currently exists in the UAE.

¶3. (S) Joseph emphasized that the implications of a nuclear Iran are huge for both the Middle East region and the world. He added that the recent IAEA resolution finding that Iran was in non-compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards requirement was unprecedented and showed that the Iranian activities are a threat to the entire international community. The IAEA's finding of Iranian non-compliance will require that the matter be referred to the U.N. Security Council. Joseph stated the need for the world to keep the pressure on Iran to bring them into line. HbZ asked if the US had any information about the secret location of Iran,s nuclear program; Joseph replied that Iran had engaged in 20-year programs of deception and concealment, adding that he believed that continued international pressure would reveal the full extent of the program, just as happened in Libya.

¶4. (S) HbZ then asked Joseph what is needed from the UAE and what cooperation the US could offer. Joseph responded that the UAE must continue to support the diplomatic effort to bring Iran to account for its program. HbZ told Joseph he had been assured by Vice President Cheney that the US would respond to Iran through diplomatic means. HbZ opined that military action against Iran would have catastrophic consequences and that the UAE would therefore support any and all diplomatic efforts to keep pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear programs.

¶5. (S) Joseph reiterated that the US government prefers the use of diplomacy to address the issue and asked HbZ his thoughts on how to handle the Iranians. HbZ responded that the only way to get Iran to comply is to have a unanimous resolution at the United Nations. He said that if Russia and China hold out, the result would provide Iran the opportunity to avoid complying with the resolution. He said further that Iran is very deceptive and manipulative and will never be transparent on their own initiative. HbZ felt that the IAEA vote strengthened the position of the EU3.

¶6. (S) Joseph then outlined the US proposal for a bilateral counterproliferation task force to address the transshipment of goods and money through the UAE in support of proliferation of WMD. He explained E.O. 13382, blocking property of designated WMD proliferators and their supporters and encouraged the UAE to continue freezing assets under the order and to consider their own legislation in this regard. HbZ said he looked forward to future discussions with the Ambassador regarding the task force and said it would be important to examine airports and seaports to address the issue. He said the media has shown the UAE in a very negative way and he hopes there will be more successes for the UAE in the future with the new task force.

¶7. (S) Joseph praised the UAE,s cooperation in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,s Container Security Initiative and the U.S. Department of Energy,s Megaports initiative. He then asked for the UAE,s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). HbZ acknowledged the vast amount of trade through Dubai,s ports and said more work needs to be done to monitor trade better. He said he would take up the issue of the PSI personally and

said he looks forward to joining.

¶18. (S) Regarding North Korea, Joseph asked Sheikh Hamdan that the UAE refrain from purchasing conventional weapons from North Korea because the revenue from such sales supports their WMD program. He also asked the UAE's assistance in stopping the transit of these weapons through the UAE. HbZ said he was unaware of the official policy of the UAE on this issue but said he would speak to the appropriate departments.

¶19. (C) HbZ said the UAE is very lucky to have such an open country and open market that attract people from all over the world and they want to maintain that. Therefore any time a flaw is found they want to fix it.

ABZ EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR UNANIMOUS ACTION AGAINST IRAN

¶10. (S) That evening, the delegation met in Dubai with Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ), the Minister of Information, who expressed to U/S Joseph that the UAE feels Iran is a much greater threat to the UAE than to the United States. Even without weapons of mass destruction, Iran is difficult to deal with and is a very tough neighbor. He emphasized that the UAE wants to be a partner in the efforts with Iran. Joseph shared AbZ's concerns about one of the most serious challenges for the international community and agreed that Iran is dangerous even without WMD, pointing out that Iran's combined missile and nuclear programs could embolden Iran and make it a threat to the entire international community. Joseph stressed that the world had to stand up to Iran and that although Iran has invested heavily in centrifuge technology under the guise of a civilian program, there is no economic rational for Iran's enrichment capability. It must to be made clear to Iran that there will negative consequences if they don't go back to the negotiating table with the EU3.

¶11. (S) AbZ told Joseph that Iran was much more dangerous than North Korea, and that Iran's nuclear ambitions would remain no matter what regime might be in favor. AbZ said he has heard that Iran's nuclear program won't stop until they can hit Washington DC with weapons of mass destruction.8 AbZ faulted Russia and China for muddying8 the message to Iran. He believes that the Iranians are seeking a confrontation with the US, but he also believes that the international community can make Iran blink.8 Iran must be given a way out and, in this regard, praised President Bush's recent proposal to provide Iran assured access to nuclear fuel in exchange for giving up its enrichment and reprocessing ambitions. Joseph responded that Iran aspires to being a great country and they wrongly believe one of the signs of a great country is a nuclear program. He said the EU3 was offering a good package of incentives to Iran. Joseph emphasized that the time to act is now because it will be even harder to deal with Iran in the future. AbZ said he thought Iran will threaten to stop exporting oil to put pressure on the international community.

¶12. (S) AbZ also reported he had heard recently that Italy and Iran had reached agreement to build a tracking satellite for Iran. He said that Iran claims it is only a telecommunications satellite but the UAE has serious concerns that the satellite is meant for more.

¶13. (S) AbZ said that Iran had gained Afghanistan and Iraq as part of their sphere of influence in recent years and currently has a good relationship with Iraq. He also pointed out that Syria has become much closer to Iran recently. AbZ opined that if we could get any positive result out of our dealings with Syria, it would have an impact on Iran. AbZ said he doesn't trust Syrian President Bashar, who believes there are two arms8 to Washington and that he can deal successfully with one of the arms. (Note: AbZ last met Bashar in Damascus on July 31.) When Joseph asked how we can accelerate the pace of change with Syria, AbZ said the Syrians are easier to deal with than Iran, but it will take time. He suggested that since Turkey is a close ally of

Syria, it would be good to get Turkey,s help to apply pressure to Syria.

¶14. (S) U/S Joseph described the proposed US/UAE Counterproliferation Task Force for AbZ and also expressed the desire for the UAE to participate in PSI, pointing out that Singapore had hosted a PSI exercise this year and Turkey will host a PSI exercise next year. Joseph told AbZ that the US Congress is viewing participation in PSI as a new good-housekeeping seal of approval for a state's commitment to non-proliferation. . AbZ promised to review the PSI documents, saying that more and more the concern in the UAE is with the smaller ports. He said that Dubai,s Jebel Ali and Rashid ports and Mina Zayed in Abu Dhabi are not as much of a problem as in the past but that ports in the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah had become problematic.

¶15. (S) In closing, AbZ said that Al Qaeda made a strategic mistake when it attacked on 9/11 because the attack has brought the international community together in the fight.

DUBAI STATE SECURITY GIVES UPDATE ON CP ACTIVITIES IN DUBAI

¶16. (S/NF) On October 2, U/S Joseph met with Brigadier Mohammed Al-Qemzi, Director of Dubai State Security Office, who started the meeting by saying he was very interested in building a national expertise in nonproliferation. He reported that the UAEG had recently formed an interagency nonproliferation task force, consisting of high level representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, as well as representatives from the Dubai Ports, Customs, and Free Zone Corporation and Civil Defense. The Ambassador asked Al Qemzi if the emirates of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah were represented on the task force, but al Qemzi,s reply was a little vague, saying that the other emirates were represented at the federal level. Al Qemzi showed Joseph a printed power point presentation describing the mission of the Task Force, which is to prevent proliferators from exploiting the free and open trading environment in the UAE to traffic in weapons of mass destruction. Al Qemzi said this would improve the image of Dubai, which has suffered adverse attention from high-profile cases such as the AQ Khan proliferation network. Al Qemzi said the task force would review national legislation and procedures to see if tougher measures are required in order to deter and detect proliferators operating in Dubai. Additional training needs for officers would be reviewed and the task force would look to increase its cooperation with international organizations, including adopting the export control lists of these organizations.

¶17. (S/NF) Al Qemzi reported that SSO had compiled a list of 28 companies that are proposed for closing because of proliferation activities. Fifteen of the companies are reported to have been closed. Ambassador noted that this information had already been provided during Oct 2004 and Feb 2005 UAEG-USG meetings. Al Qemzi then advised that there was nothing in the pipeline for future action. Al Qemzi said some of the companies are officially owned by the Iranian government and therefore SSO has to move carefully with these companies, in some cases taking only administrative action, such as refusing to renew visas for employees, to deter the companies, proliferation activities. He conceded that some of these companies had attempted to open up again at other locations and under different names. Al Qemzi said that the Iranians are well aware of these activities and are wondering why the sudden change in Dubai,s policy towards Iran. He said that he has heard the Iranians may have stopped their activities in Dubai because of these recent actions taken by Dubai.

¶18. (S) Joseph summarized for Al Qemzi the proposed bilateral US-UAE nonproliferation task force and Al Qemzi welcomed such a step. He reiterated that it was important to improve the UAE,s image in the world.

¶19. (S/NF) Another problem for the Dubai authorities, said

Qemzi, is the Mahmoud Seif case, who is under indictment in the US for the attempted diversion of night vision goggles to Iran. Seif was released on bail by the Dubai courts. Although his passport has been retained by the Dubai authorities, Al Qemzi speculated that the Iranian government might issue him a new one so that he can travel back to Iran. He also pointed out that the Austrian authorities who arrested Seif on the charges relating to the night vision goggles were not concerned about Seif.

¶20. (S/NF) Joseph expressed concern about the Syrian WMD programs and told Al Qemzi that the USG looks forward to cooperation on illicit acquisition efforts by Syria. Curiously, Al Qemzi told Joseph he had no information on such activities by the Syrians but would certainly welcome cooperation on the issue.

¶21. (S/NF) Regarding North Korea, Joseph said the US is asking countries to forgo purchasing conventional weapons because the hard currency earned through these sales goes to support North Korea's WMD programs. He asked for Dubai's cooperation in preventing the transshipment of these conventional weapons through the UAE. Al Qemzi and his staff said there is little activity by North Korea in the UAE, saying one North Korean company in Dubai was closed and another North Korean company located in the Jebel Ali Free Zone traded in toys and plastics. Joseph pointed out that North Korea does not trade in toys.

¶22. (S/NF) Al Qemzi told Joseph that he believed there was considerable internal support in Iran for Iran's nuclear program and it would be hard to stop the program. He commented on Iran's recent movement of investment and companies but was not sure such activity was similar to such moves by Libya prior to the imposition of sanctions.

¶23. (U) This message was cleared by U/S Joseph.
QUINN